Multiparty Probability Computation and Verification by Kak, Subhash
1 
 
Multiparty Probability Computation and Verification 
Subhash Kak 
 
Abstract: A multiparty computation protocol is described in which the parties can generate 
different probability events that is based on the sharing of a single anonymized random 
number, and also perform oblivious transfer.  A method to verify the correctness of the 
procedure, without revealing the random numbers used by the parties, is proposed. 
 
1. Introduction 
Imagine a group of individuals who wish to generate a probability event that is to be mapped 
to specific payoffs [1],[2]. The motivation for this could be the casino or a variety of 
situations in multiparty computing [3]-[5]. If the event is the specific value of a random 
variable, how are the individuals to be certain that the procedure is honest? Such events can 
be generated by random physical processes that are either classical [6]-[11] or quantum [12]-
[16]. But since physical processes are associated with a specific location they are often not 
convenient for applications where the individuals may be computer nodes at distant places. 
Bu even a physical process must have performance that can be mathematically established for 
it will interface with other systems that can be attacked. In practice, we seek decentralized or 
hybrid procedures which can be shown to be mathematically secure.  
 
In some cases, two parties may mutually arrive at a probability event using the decentralized 
oblivious transfer (OT) protocol which is based on hardness of certain number-theoretic 
mappings [17],[18]. In all such cases it must be assumed that the two parties are authenticated 
to each other in order to forestall man-in-the-middle (MIM) and other attacks [3]-
[5],[19],[20]. In order to detect cheaters, one needs a verification procedure that does not 
reveal information on the random number generators used by the communicating parties for 
that could compromise the security of the system as was shown recently for a two-party 
situation [19]. Verification could also be based on secret sharing systems [21]-[23] but that 
constitutes a different kind of a system that will not be investigated here. 
 
In this paper we first present a protocol for sharing a random number between more than two 
parties. Then we present a general verification procedure for multiparty probability events 
that involves oblivious transfer. The procedure consists of three parts: first, the set-up where 
initial information is exchanged by the parties to agree on a random number; second, a 
mapping process that takes the input to the range [0,1] with uniform probability; and third, 
the verification process. 
 
2. Initial set up 
Consider communicating parties Alice, Bob, and Charlie (the list can be augmented but here 
for simplicity we only speak of three) who wish to perform a secure computation, which is 
the sharing of random number.  The first thing to be done is to create aliases so that actions 
within the computation are protected by the complexity of the computation. Each of these 
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aliases is a random number. The three also wish to generate a single number that connects 
them with the multiparty computation. 
 
In a centralized system (Figure 1), the trusted authority T performs the computation on the 
numbers a, b, c sent respectively by Alice, Bob, and Charlie. The numbers should be sent to 
T in a manner that hides each sender’s identity. This requires a privacy preserving 
transformation where this hiding is accomplished by means of an appropriate one-way 
function. 
 
Let the transformation carried out by T map the numbers to the range, R, which is [0,1]: 
 
 ),,( cbaTR            (1) 
 
R maps to different probabilities CHARLIEBOBALICE ppp ,, for the three communicating parties. 
This mapping may be done by assigning non-overlapping one-thirds of the range [0,1] to the 
three parties. 
 
CHARLIEBOBALICE ppp ,, = fi (R)        (2) 
 
The difficulty with this centralized procedure is that the users do not know if the 
transformation T is good at randomization. Although there is no way for them to confirm that 
the output R has a distribution which is uniform over [0,1], a strong hashing function will be 
considered satisfactory in most cases. Centralized procedures are implemented in many 
computer-controlled applications like the ones in a casino or in online gambling. In these 
latter applications, the assignment of probabilities is determined by the nature of the 
computation (or game) and the house is also assigned a certain portion of the take in 
accordance with law. 
      
             
  Figure 1. Centralized system with trusted authority; (right) decentralized system 
 
The difference between the centralized and the decentralized systems is shown in Figure 1. In 
a decentralized system, after the users have been authenticated by some other protocol, they 
will send their random numbers a, b, and c to each other. The DH protocol [24], based on the 
use of a large prime p and integer u of large order modulo p, may be used by the three to 
exchange numbers between each pair. This procedure is more than just a pairwise exchange 
of random numbers as in the standard DH protocol, since a product of the three must also be 
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exchanged. This latter step is required before functions like that of (1) and (2) may be 
implemented. 
 
The Protocol 
The protocol begins with a pairwise exchange of random numbers and then the product of the 
three: 
 
Step 1. Alice and Bob share puab mod , Bob and Charlie share pubc mod , and Charlie 
and Alice share puac mod . (Figure 2)
 
 
Step 2. Bob sends puab mod to Charlie, who sends pubc mod to Alice, who sends 
puac mod to Bob. 
 
Step 3. Using their secret numbers, each is now able to compute the same key to be 
shared amongst them which is puabc mod . (Figure 3) 
 
 
Figure 2. Pairwise exchange of random numbers 
      
           
Figure 3. Generation of the single key u
abc
 mod p 
 
 
As is clear from the working of this protocol as shown in Figures 2 and 3, the pairwise 
sharing of numbers as well as the final generation of a single number can be generalized to 
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any number of parties. As is to be expected, the results do depend on the order in which the 
updating is done. 
 
If the sharing of the random number is for the award of a prize, the participants are assigned 
random numbers and a standard hashing application. For example, for three participants, the 
parties randomly called 1, 2, and 3, will compute the hash of u
abc
 and sum the two least 
significant bits of the hash. To account for the discrepancy between four cases and only three 
players, one may use the mapping: 
 
 00 – repeat the algorithm 
 01 – Player 1 wins 
 10—Player 2 wins 
 11—Player 3 wins 
 
In the case of 2
k
 players, if a similar mapping was used, one would not need to repeat the 
process. 
 
If one wished to use this protocol to generate oblivious transfer then the parties should 
randomly choose between a set of potential bases as in Step 4. 
 
Step 4. The three parties choose from different public numbers of larger order mod p. 
We will call these u, v, w, ….  
 
We can imagine that the payoff is a prize that will be locked by the key generated by Alice 
and, therefore, available to those who get to share the key. In other words, this case can have 
multiple winners. 
 
Example 1. Consider that the base integers used by the three are two in number and let’s call 
them u and w (Figure 4).  We will show that the two parties who pick the same base do not 
end up with the shared secret between them.  
 
Figure 4. Generation of key when there are two bases 
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The rows of Table 1 going from top to bottom show intermediate steps in the formation of the 
key. In this example, the user whose pick is in the minority ends up getting the shared key. 
  Table 1.  
A B C 
u u w 
w
ac
 u
ab
 u
ac
 
u
abc
 w
abc
 u
abc 
 
None of the parties will know which one is the odd one out in the choice of the base. Alice 
does not know whether Bob or Charlie have the shared key, or if both of them have it (which 
is the case if they all pick the same base). Summarizing, we can sum it up in Table 2 (where 
the first three columns show the initial choice of the bases): 
Table 2.  
A B C Result 
u u u A, B and C share key  
u u w
 
A, C share key 
u w  u B, C don’t share key with A 
w u u A, B share key 
 
In the above 4 cases, A shares key with one of the other two (or both) in three out of four 
cases. These could be compared to the four sequences 11, 01, 00, 10, where 1 represents 
sharing and 0 represents not sharing. 
 
3. The case of four parties 
In the case of four parties and two bases (u and w), the following cases will be different: 
 
i. All chosen bases are the same (in which case the keys would be identical) 
ii. Three  choose one base and the fourth chooses another 
iii. Two adjacent parties choose one base and the other two pick a different one 
iv. Two non-adjacent parties choose one base and the other two pick the other 
 
The cases ii, iii, and iv are described by Tables 3, 4, and 5, respectively. 
Table 3.  
A B C D 
u u u w 
w
ad 
u
ab 
u
bc 
u
cd 
u
acd
 w
abd
 u
abc 
u
bcd 
u
abcd 
u
abcd
 w
abcd
 u
abcd
 
 
Table 4.  
A B C D 
u u w w 
w
ad 
u
ab 
u
bc 
w
cd 
w
acd
 w
abd
 u
abc 
u
bcd 
u
abcd 
w
abcd
 w
abcd
 u
abcd
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Table 5.  
A B C D 
u w u w 
w
ad 
u
ab 
w
bc 
u
cd 
u
acd
 w
abd
 u
abc 
w
bcd 
w
abcd 
u
abcd
 w
abcd
 u
abcd
 
 
In case (ii), B and D share the key with A; in case (iii), only D shares the key with A; and in 
case (iv), C shares the key with A. Since the key generation process has three steps 
(represented by the three bottom rows of each table), the base travels one step to the right at 
each stage, ending up 3 positions to the right which is equivalent to one position to the left.  
 
In Table 3, the total favorable probability of one of the three (B,C,D) obtaining the same key 
as A is 4/9 as shown in Table 6: 
Table 6.  
A B C D Result 
u u u w A, B, and D share key  
u u w
 
u A, C, and D share key 
u w  u u B, C, and D don’t share key with A 
w u u u A, B, and C share key 
 
If sharing of key with A by B, C, and D is represented by 1, these four cases represent the 
sequences 101, 010, 000, and 110. The cases of Table 4 map to the sequences 001, 100, 011, 
and that of Table 5 to the sequence 010. 
 
Clearly, such analysis can be extended to more general cases. 
 
4. Verification process for three base integers 
Now consider that there are three base integers, u, v, and w. To forestall cheating by any 
party, one would need to develop a verification sequence by using a previously announced 
random number r that is used as an exponent on the respective raw keys. 
 
Consider the sequence pwvunG nnn mod)(  . To relate the three variables amongst each 
other, we need a quadratic expansion of the kind below: 
 
  puuu mod
23    
pvvv mod23    
pwww mod23           (3) 
This may be written down as the matrix equation: 
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The solution of this equation is easily found to be: 
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This may be simplified to  
 
uvwwuvwuvwvu    );( );(      (5) 
 
Theorem 1. pnGnGnGnG mod)3()2()1()(       (6) 
Proof. )(nG = pwvu nnn mod)(   
  = pwwvvuu nnn mod)( 333333     
  = pwwwvvvuuu nnn mod)()()( 232323      
  = pnGnGnG mod)3()2()1(    
 
The sum of successive powers of v and w suffices to establish that they have been computed 
to the same exponent. All that is required to find the values of α and β is the solution to 
equation (3) for k = 2. No knowledge of the actual value of n is needed while computing 
equation (6). 
 
Example 2. Let u=2, v=3, and w=5 mod 17. To find α, β, and γ, we use equation (5), 
obtaining: 
 
17mod 13 ;3 ;10    
 
The series 17mod532)( nnnnG  , for n = 0, 1, 2, 3,… is as follows: 
 
 
 3, 10, 4, 7, 8, 0, 13, … 
 
for which each nth element is 10 G(n-1)+3G(n-2) +13G(n-3) mod 17. For example, the value 
13 is 10×0+3×8+13×7 mod 17. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper considers the problem of generation of random events. A multiparty computation 
protocol is described in which the parties can generate different probability events, which is 
achieved by sharing a single anonymized random number. The paper also describes a method 
of multiparty oblivious transfer using DH protocol.  Several specific cases of two bases used 
by three or four parties are considered and the cases where the parties will end up sharing the 
key with the generating party are identified.  
 
A method to verify the correctness of the procedure, without revealing the random numbers 
used by the parties, is also proposed.  
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